Spousal Insurance and the Amplification of Business Cycles

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^{*a*}The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Motivation & research question

- Households face large income uncertainty that varies with the business cycle.
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 - household savings
 public transfers
 exclusive focus of HANK literature

 - 3. family labor supply

Q: Does family labor supply shapes the business cycle and its impact on households?

Contribution to literature

- Spousal labor supply response to job loss (added worker effect): Lundberg 1985; Mankart and Oikonomou 2017; Ellieroth 2019; Birinci 2021; Pruitt and Turner 2020; Busch et al. 2020; Guner et al. 2020; Andersen et al. 2021
 - \longrightarrow heterogeneity: AWE is low on average but highly selected
 - \longrightarrow general equilibrium: spillovers to other households, multiplier effect
- Women's employment and the business cycle: Doepke and Tertilt 2016; Albanesi and Şahin 2018; Albanesi 2019; Fukui, Nakamura and Steinsson 2018
 → microfounded gender differences
- **3. Idiosyncratic risk and business cycles:** McKay and Reis 2016; Den Haan et al. 2018; Bayer et al. 2019; Patterson 2021; Graves 2020; Gornemann et al. 2021
 - \longrightarrow relevance of ex-ante heterogeneity (gender & family size) on top of MPCs
 - \longrightarrow fast & robust solution method for models with discrete-continuous choices

- 1. Surveying the evidence: a spousal insurance puzzle?
- 2. Micro: spousal insurance & consequences of job loss
- 3. Macro: spousal insurance & aggregate dynamics

Surveying the evidence

- Is spousal labor supply effective insurance against cyclical income risk?
- Administrative data on household income (US). [Pruitt and Turner 2020]
 - · household income is less volatile than individual income
 - women's income is less cyclical than men's income
 - non-employed women are more likely to enter when husband's income falls
 - · employed women's income declines more when husband's income rises
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- Event studies of job loss (US, Denmark). [Birinci 2021; Andersen et al. 2021]
 - average job loser suffers large and persistent income loss
 - spouse of average job loser raises her earnings only by a small amount
 - presence of secondary earner mitigates the impact on household income

 $ightarrow\,$ spousal labor supply is weak insurance against job loss of primary earner

 \leftarrow active

 \leftarrow passive

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- Administrative earnings data show clear signs of spousal insurance.
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- Is that a contradiction?
 - 1. passive insurance should not be ignored, joint job loss is very rare
 - 2. observing small response on average does not imply that active channel is weak
- Next: demonstrate 2. in a structural model.

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Micro model overview

- Unitary household with 2 members—called male and female.
- Standard incomplete markets model with labor search.
 - save in risk-free asset a > 0 (no borrowing)
 - individual productivity $e \in \{e_1, \ldots, e_m\}$ follows Markov process
 - individual job-finding rate f and separation rate σ
- Two special features.
 - male job loss can lead to persistent decline in earnings $\mathbf{s}_m \in \{\mathbf{E}, \mathbf{E}_l, \mathbf{U}\}$
 - female makes non-trivial participation decision

 $S_f \in \{E, U, N\}$

Quarterly frequency (building block of estimated HANK model)

Stages: shocks and decisions

- 0. Household enters the period.
- 1. Productivity shocks are realized.
- 2. If employed, lose job with probability σ_f, σ_m .
- 3. Female participation decision (male always participates).

•	stay employed,	search for job,	be out of labor force
	utility cost φ	utility cost χ	utility cost 0

- 4. If searching, find job with probability f_f, f_m .
- 5. Consumption-savings decision.

 (s_f, s_m, e_f, e_m, a) $(s_f, s_m, e'_f, e'_m, a)$ $(s'_f, s'_m, e'_f, e'_m, a)$ $(s''_f, s'_m, e'_f, e'_m, a)$

 $\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{s}_{f}^{\prime\prime\prime}, \mathbf{s}_{m}^{\prime\prime}, \mathbf{e}_{f}^{\prime}, \mathbf{e}_{m}^{\prime}, \mathbf{a} \end{pmatrix} \\ \\ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{s}_{f}^{\prime\prime\prime}, \mathbf{s}_{m}^{\prime\prime}, \mathbf{e}_{f}^{\prime}, \mathbf{e}_{m}^{\prime}, \mathbf{a}^{\prime} \end{pmatrix}$

Consumption-savings decision

• Bellman equation:

$$V^{(5)}(\mathbf{s}_{f}, \mathbf{s}_{m}, \mathbf{e}_{f}, \mathbf{e}_{m}, a) = \max_{c, a' \ge 0} u(c) + \beta V^{(0)}(\mathbf{s}_{f}, \mathbf{s}_{m}, \mathbf{e}_{f}, \mathbf{e}_{m}, a')$$

s.t. $c + a' = \underbrace{(1 - \tau_{t}) \left[\mathbf{y}_{f} + \mathbf{y}_{m} \right]^{1-\lambda}}_{\text{post-tax household income}} + (1 + r)a$

• Pre-tax individual income:

$$\mathbf{y}_{f} = \begin{cases} w_{f}e_{f} & \text{for } s_{f} = E \\ 0 & \text{for } s_{f} = N \end{cases} \qquad \qquad \mathbf{y}_{m} = \begin{cases} w_{m}e_{m} & \text{for } s_{m} = E \\ w_{m}e_{m}(1-\varrho) & \text{for } s_{f} = E_{l} \\ be_{m} & \text{for } s_{m} = U \end{cases}$$

- Calibrate the model to contemporary US economy
 - gross flows between E and U for married men and women aged 25–55
 - average gender wage gap of 19%
 - average quarterly MPC of 25%
 - process of male earnings loss follows Gornemann et al. (2021)
- Conduct an event study of job loss in the model.
 - **sample**: male starts period 0 in a good job
 - treatment group: male loses his job in stage 2 of period 0
 - control group: male does not lose his job in stage 2 of period 0
- · Construct treatment effects from law of motion without simulation.

Spousal insurance and the consequences of job loss (part 1)



Male income falls persistently (targeted).

- may find new job in quarter 0
- but it is likely to be a bad job

Female labor supply increases very little.

Household income still falls much less.

passive insurance

Average responses are in line with empirical event studies.

Spousal insurance and the consequences of job loss (part 2)



Male income is purely exogenous.

 \rightarrow uniform responses

Female (household) income reflects **uncorrelated shocks** & **optimal choice**.

 \rightarrow heterogeneous responses

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Next: what if female participation decision was random?

• fix choice probabilities at their mean

Shutting down active insurance (part 1)



Random participation: dispersion in HH income is fully exogenous (no role of optimal choice)

Shutting down active insurance (part 2)



Random participation: average cumulative consumption loss is 21% larger

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Macro outlook

- We saw that spousal labor supply mitigates the consequences of job loss.
 - · but most households don't experience job loss even in a deep recession
 - how much can spousal insurance matter for macro dynamics?

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- This is a quantitative question. Channels to consider:
 - 1. precautionary behavior of every household 🕩 Jacobians
 - 2. aggregate demand spillovers
 - 3. labor market congestion
 - 4. income tax spillovers

> general equilibrium

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 - 3. labor market congestion \rangle general equilibrium
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- In progress: characterize 2.–4. in estimated HANK model.
 - Sequence-Space Jacobian framework: heterogeneity presents zero conceptual or practical difficulty for time-series estimation [Auclert, Bardóczy, Rognlie and Straub 2021]

- Spousal labor supply substantially mitigates individual unemployment risk.
 - passive: married women have stable jobs & joint job loss is very rare
 - · active: low average can mask large non-random heterogeneity
- Standard practice in HANK literature is to model households as individuals with an income process estimated on male data. These choices lead to
 - overstating income risk facing households
 - ignoring a class of precautionary behavior with unique GE spillovers

Thank you!

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Optimal participation: lean against separation rate, consumption falls much less

One-time increase in male and female separation rates 4 periods ahead

♦ back

Whose income risk?



Figure 1: Distribution of One-Year Labor Income Growth from Pruitt & Turner (2020)