Discussion of "Credit Booms, Financial Crises and Macroprudential Policy" by Mark Gertler, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Andrea Prestipino

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The views expressed on this discussion are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank

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What it does

1. Develop macro model of banking panics and boom-bust cycles

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2. Study macroprudential regulation in that model (state-contigent leverage requirements for banks)

What it does // How it does it

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Banking panics

2. Study macroprudential regulation in that model

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Banking panics

 \rightarrow Same as Gertler, Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2018)

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Banking panics

- \rightarrow Same as Gertler, Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2018)
- $\rightarrow\,$ Shocks to fundamentals + Failure to roll over debt + ...
 - \dots + Self-fulfilling beliefs + Sunspots

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Boom-bust cycles NEW !!!

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 \rightarrow News shocks to fundamentals + Banks' optimism

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 - $\circ~+$ News shock $\rightarrow\uparrow$ Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity

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 - + News shock $\rightarrow \uparrow$ Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity
 - Optimism $\rightarrow \uparrow$ (Perceived) Tobin's Q & Banks' borrowing capacity
 - 2. Study macroprudential regulation in that model

1. Banking panics \rightarrow Bank runs & Amplification effects

2. Banking panics + News-driven optimism $\rightarrow \uparrow$ Amplification effects Boom-bust cycles

3. Optimal regulation \rightarrow Macroprudential requirement binds when banks' net worth attains intermediate values

My comments



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Q: Is news-driven optimism really needed to generate boom-bust cycles in Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki economy?

- Q: Is news-driven optimism really needed to generate boom-bust cycles in Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki economy?
- A: Not sure! Let's look at a continuous-time version of that economy...



 \rightarrow based on Van der Ghote (2016)

Leverage multiple 10 4 8 3.5 Invariant distribution 6 3 2.5 2 2 0.05 0 0.45 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 Bank net worth

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Takeaways

- \rightarrow News-driven optimism does not seem necessary to generate boom-bust cycles
- $\rightarrow\,$ News shocks and/or bank's optimism just amplify those cycles
- \rightarrow If willing to stick with news-driven optimism, it would be useful to provide further empirical justification!



Van der Ghote (European Central Bank)

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Questions to addressed

On determinants of optimal macroprudential interventions

 → What determines region in which macroprudential leverage requirements become binding?
Does probability of bank run matter?
Why does not binding status of IC constraint matter?

On effects of macroprudential policy

 → What is the effect of macroprudential leverage requirements on frequency and intensity of bank runs?
And on amplitude and duration of boom-bust cycles?

#3: Interactions with monetary policy



RTF Day-After Workshop

Monetary Policy, MacroPrudential Policy and Financial Stability 19 December 2018 (9:30-14:30)

C2.01, Main Building

Questions for further research...

 → What is the effect of monetary policy on probability and intensity of bank runs?
And on amplitude and duration of boom-bust cycles?

→ Should monetary policy clean, lean or not respond to financial stability concerns?

What this paper does

- 1. Develop macro model of banking panics and boom-bust cycles
- 2. Study macroprudential regulation in that model

Very interesting paper! Highly recommended

Banking panics + News-driven optimism





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Banking panics + News-driven optimism



-Sunspot observed - - No Sunspot observed

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